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I. Introduction
In September of 2008, Tribune Company ("Tribune") and Local
TV Holdings, LLC ("Local TV") announced that they had entered
into an agreement whereby Local TV would take on certain operating
functions of two Tribune stations-KWGN in Denver and KPLR in
St. Louis-by combining them with operations at Local TV's existing
properties in those same markets. According to the companies' joint
press release, the agreements "will allow the stations to locate in the
same facility, use combined news operations and share certain
programming."' Local TV's chief executive officer Bobby Lawrence
further explained that:
[T]he television industry is on the cusp of change. The
internet [sic], mobile, TiVo and alternative distribution
channels are growing forms of content distribution. As our
audience finds new ways to get content we need to streamline
our delivery costs and provide more local programming, news
and community information. With Tribune as our partner, we
can streamline the back office and news gathering [sic] costs,
while still giving viewers access to two great and very different
stations and content. It is the way of the future, and we are
excited to be a part of TV's evolution.2
Although the agreement between Tribune and Local TV is
somewhat unusual because it involves stations in relatively large
television markets,3 the idea of two competing broadcasters entering
into cooperative contracts is not new. Indeed, the idea of time
brokerage, a practice that involves one party "buying" or "leasing"
airtime on another party's broadcasting station, dates back nearly to
the origins of the medium itself. But as the increasingly competitive
media landscape forces broadcasters to confront economic challenges,
many broadcasters are entering into various business arrangements
1. Press Release, Tribune Company & Local TV, LLC, Tribune and Local TV to
Partner in St. Louis and Denver (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://corporate.tribune.com/pressroom/?p=202.
2. Id.
3. Denver is ranked seventeenth largest; St. Louis the twenty-first. See The Nielsen
Company, Local Television Market Universe Estimates, nielsen, http://en-us.nielsen.com
/content/dam/nielsenenus/documents/pdflMisc/2010-2011 %20DMA%20Ranks.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2010).
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with competitors in an attempt to reduce expenditures by creating
and leveraging efficiencies and economies of scale and scope.
Though such agreements vary in terms of form, these agreements
fundamentally involve two or more competing broadcasters
combining forces, pooling resources, or otherwise collaborating. It is
widely understood that coordination among competitors in a
particular market has the potential to raise antitrust concerns, yet
neither the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, nor the Federal
Trade Commission-the agencies charged with enforcing the nation's
antitrust laws-have responded to the practice. Similarly, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or the "Commission")-the
agency responsible for licensing and monitoring broadcasters' use of
the public electromagnetic spectrum-has evaluated the issues
surrounding such cooperative agreements only occasionally and
usually in connection with its statutorily mandated periodic review of
its ownership rules.
Despite the laissez-faire approach to regulating cooperative
agreements between competing broadcasters, these agreements, and
the relationship between competitors that they create, look
suspiciously similar to the sort of arrangements that were quickly
becoming commonplace in the newspaper industry of the 1930s.
Those agreements typically combined the "back-end" functions of
competing newspapers-e.g., printing, distribution, and sales-while
maintaining separate editorial operations. Newspaper owners argued
that such cost sharing was necessary to keep newspapers
economically viable and, as such, could continue to provide their
communities with separate and independent editorial voices. The
Antitrust Division brought suit against the parties to one such joint
operating arrangement in 1965, arguing that it unlawfully restrained
trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The government prevailed,
but while the case was on appeal, newspaper industry heavyweights
lobbied Congress to pass the Newspaper Preservation Act, which
4. See, e.g., Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc., Annual Report (form 10-K), at 22
(Mar. 31, 2009) ("In some of our markets, we have created duopolies by entering into
what we refer to as local service agreements. While these agreements take varying forms, a
typical local service agreement is an agreement between two separately owned television
stations serving the same market, whereby the owner of one station provides operational
assistance to the other station, subject to ultimate editorial and other controls being
exercised by the latter station's owner. By operating or entering into local service
agreements with more than one station in a market, we (and the other station) achieve
significant operational efficiencies. We also broaden our audience reach and enhance our
ability to capture more advertising spending in a given market.").
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effectively granted qualifying newspapers immunity from antitrust
liability for entering into joint operating agreements. Thus, in the
newspaper context, there exists both precedent that such agreements
are anticompetitive and a statutory framework that prescribes the
circumstances in which such practices are permissible. In
broadcasting, no such precedent or framework exists.
This article endeavors to accomplish four principal objectives:
Part II examines the form and function of cooperative agreements
among broadcasters and explores the reasons why such agreements
are attractive business propositions for those who enter them. Parts
III and IV describe the regulatory context in which these agreements
exist, from a communications and antitrust law perspective,
respectively. Finally, Part V looks back at the newspaper industry
and the conduct that gave rise to the antitrust enforcement action
against joint operating agreements, the subsequent passage of the
Newspaper Preservation Act, and then sets forth some suggestions for
future regulatory treatment of cooperative agreements in
broadcasting.
In brief, this article concludes that while cooperative agreements
likely offer many procompetitive benefits, both the FCC and antitrust
enforcers should take a more active, cooperative role in reviewing
and monitoring agreements between competing broadcasters and
consider the potentially adverse effects of such arrangements across
each potentially affected market, including the market for audience
share, the market for advertisers, the market for carriage, and the
marketplace of ideas.
II. Conunon Relationships Between Competing Broadcasters
The term "cooperative agreements" is used throughout this article
to encompass a broad range of agreements into which broadcasters
may enter. As noted earlier, although the nature and scope of these
agreements can vary widely, they are fundamentally the same in that
they all involve competing broadcasters entering into agreements
with each other to provide services, support, or programming.
A. Types of Agreements
There are several types of cooperative agreements in use
throughout the industry today:
(1) Local marketing agreements, also often referred to as time
brokerage agreements (and referred to in this article simply as
"LMAs"), involve a broadcasting station (the FCC "licensee") leasing
4 [33:1
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all or substantially all of its airtime to a third party who takes over the
programming and operational aspects of the station (the "broker").'
Such arrangements typically involve a cash payment back to the
licensee for use of its station, making the arrangement akin to a
typical commercial lease relationship, whereby a property owner
allows a lessee to use a particular piece of property for a prescribed
period of time in exchange for periodic payments. FCC regulations
provide that regardless of the scope of the agreement between the
broker and the licensee, it is the licensee that remains ultimately
responsible for the proper, lawful operation of the station.
(2) Joint sales agreements ("JSAs") are akin to LMAs in that they
involve a licensee handing over certain operational functions to a
third party broker; however, while an LMA involves broad swaths of
the licensee's airtime, a typical JSA simply allows a broker to sell
advertising on the licensee's station in return for a fee paid to the
licensee.! JSAs are, in a sense, broader than LMAs because they
allow the broker to sell all of the licensee's commercial time; yet, in
another sense, they are narrower than LMAs in that they only permit
the broker to sell commercials, rather than program entire portions of
the licensee's broadcast day.'
(3) Shared service agreements provide for certain functions to be
performed collectively or by one of the parties to the agreement for
the benefit of the other party, so as to reap scale economies and other
efficiencies. Typical services contemplated by these agreements
include program production (most commonly, one party producing
newscasts for the other); co-location of studio, master control, and
transmission facilities; groundskeeping, security, and building
5. The FCC describes such relationships as "the sale by a licensee of discrete blocks
of time to a 'broker' that supplies the programming to fill that time and sells commercial
spot announcements in it." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 note 2, para. (j)(2010).
6. In the LMA context, the lessor is the holder of an FCC license to operate on a
particular channel or frequency, and the lessee takes over certain programming and
operational functions of the station and makes periodic payments back to the lessor.
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 note 2, para. (k)(2010).
8. As a practical matter, most modern LMAs contemplate that the broker will
program all or substantially all of the time on the brokered station. As one broadcaster
noted, "JSAs affect only a limited aspect of station operations, namely sales, and hence
JSAs do not raise concerns equivalent to those associated with LMAs." In the Matter of
Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast and
Cable/MDS Interests; Review of the Commission's Regulations and Policies Affecting
Investment in the Broadcast Industry; Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest
Policy, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 12559, para. 119 (1999) (citing comments of Paxon
Communications Corporation).
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management services; non-managerial and administrative support
services; accounting and finance services; traffic (commercial
scheduling) and billing; and similar support services.
Recently a specific type of shared service framework, sometimes
referred to as a "news sharing" or "content pooling agreement," has
become relatively common. These agreements provide for the
sharing of footage and other raw material among pool members for
their own newscasts and other local productions. Stations believe
that such agreements allow them to cover more stories and offer more
in-depth coverage than they otherwise could because their
newsgathering costs are reduced significantly.! A recent trade press
article suggests that combining non-programming or non-editorial
functions may become more commonplace as stations continue to
identify areas ripe for cost cutting and efficiency enhancements.10
One engineering consultant suggested that an ideal arrangement
would establish a "third-party external company . . .in each market
that would provide services for all aspects of the stations that do not
compete.""
(4) Ad hoc cooperative agreements are less formal, sometimes
impromptu arrangements that allow stations to cooperate briefly
toward a specific, mutually desirable end. Most recently, as the
United States prepared to transition from analog to digital
broadcasting, many stations collaborated on promotional efforts to
help educate their communities about the transition and the need to
buy a digital converter box for those that did not obtain television
signals through cable or satellite transmissions.
B. Historical Development
The origins of time brokerage and other cooperative agreements
among competing broadcasters date back to before the passage of the
9. See, e.g., Staff, West Michigan TVs Pooling News Video, TVNEWSCHECKM (July
6, 2009), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2009/07/06/daily.7/ (arrangement between
three television stations said to "create[] efficiencies that will let [the stations] focus more
resources on local enterprise reporting"); Kim McAvoy, News Sharing: One for All, All
For One?, TVNEWSCHECK, (May 20, 2009), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2009/05
/20/daily.1/ ("The pooling arrangement [between two Phoenix television stations] allowed
each of the stations to assign freed-up crews to stories that might distinguish them from
the others").
10. Jim Barthold, Outsourcing Master Control Gains Traction, TVNEWSCHECK, (Jul.
2, 2009), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2009/07/02/daily.11/.
11. Id.
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1934 Communications Act.12 While the prominence of such
arrangements and the contemporary LMA and JSA constructs are
often attributed to the widespread industry deregulation of the 1990s,
the model of a program supplier leasing time on a broadcasting
station-the chief characteristic of a local marketing or time
brokerage agreement-is not a particularly new innovation.
The history of LMAs can be described in terms of three key eras,
beginning with the use of such agreements as a means by which to
make niche programming available to a broader audience, then
moving into the use of such agreements as a way to accelerate the
benefits of an acquisition pending formal approval by the FCC and
antitrust regulators, and finally, their use as the centerpiece of
emerging broadcasting business models.
1. A Mechanism to Achieve Programming Diversity
Unlike many of today's cooperative agreements, early time
brokerage agreements did not involve competing broadcasters;
rather, they allowed program producers to secure carriage of their
programming by buying airtime on broadcasting stations. The FCC
first recognized the practice in 1938 when it was called upon to select
from among several applicants for a single broadcast license; one
applicant was disqualified because he had previously operated a
station that relinquished too much of its airtime to a broker. 3 Shortly
thereafter, the FCC considered a "management contract" between
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company and National
Broadcasting Company ("NBC") whereby NBC would manage and
provide programming for Westinghouse's stations.14 Although
Westinghouse retained formal ownership of the stations, NBC was
entitled to the revenues derived from its programming."
12. In the Matter of Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice of Inquiry on
Part-Time Programming, Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C. 2d 107, para. 3 (1980) [hereinafter
1980 Policy Statement on Part-Time Programming] ("Radio programming has long been
marked by the sale of discrete blocks of time to brokers who provide both programming
and the commercial messages which support it, and by Commission concern with such
practices. In fact, brokered foreign language programs were common in large markets
even before passage of the 1934 Communications Act." (footnotes omitted)).
13. Stephen F. Sewell, The Federal Communications Commission and Time
Brokerage: A Regulatory Change of Course, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 89, 90 (1995)
(citing In re Metropolitan Broad. Corp., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the
Commission, 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938)).
14. Id. at 90-91 (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., Opinion and Order on
Petition to Reconsider and Grant Without Hearing, 8 F.C.C. 195 (1940)).
15. Id.
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Traditionally, time brokerage was used to provide "specialized
programming, including foreign language programming"" for which
the target audience was too limited to support a full schedule of
content. Based on a recognition that time brokerage "could foster
healthy program competition and enhance diversity of programming
by encouraging independently produced programming," the FCC
formally endorsed the practice in 1980.17
Despite its approval of time brokerage, the Commission
prohibited competing stations in a particular geographic market from
entering into such arrangements.18 In 1989, the FCC abolished its
limitation on time brokerage agreements between competitors, noting
that the competitive landscape had become more vibrant.
Specifically, the FCC concluded that:
[C]ompetitive conditions require a station that decides to
broker its time to another remain alert to the needs of its
audience or risk losing some of that audience to a competitor,
with a resultant decrease in ratings and revenue. Thus, the
amount of choice available to listeners and viewers insures
that competition will be vigorous in order for a station to
retain its share of the audience.
The FCC continued to relax its enforcement posture throughout
the early 1990s, leading the practice of time brokerage to become
more widely accepted. As described by former FCC attorney
Stephen Sewell, the new regulatory approach was derived from six
rulings, from which four common themes emerged:
(1) the amount of time permitted to be brokered was all or
nearly all of the brokered stations broadcast week, including
news and issue-oriented programming; (2) the area served in
common by the two stations was very substantial, often
involving encompassment of one station's service area by the
other, and always involving substantial overlap of the stations'
principal-community contours, the strongest field intensity
contour used by the [FCC] for administrative purposes; (3)
16. 1980 Policy Statement on Part-Time Programming, supra note 12, at n.2.
17. Id. at para. 2.
18. In the Matter of Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest Policy,
Policy Statement, 4 FCC Rcd. 2208, para. 7 (1989).
19. Id. at para. 37.
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the licensee of the brokered station reduced its staff
substantially, usually by eliminating all engineering staff; and
(4) all brokered licensees asserted that they would retain
ultimate control, and specifically retained the right to cancel
or suspend programs and commercials, and to substitute
20programs they considered to be of greater importance.
The new policies suggest that, although licensees must maintain
final control over their programming, the FCC's new enforcement
position effectively allows brokers to take over all or substantially all
of a brokered station's operations without actually transferring the
broadcast license.
2. Attendant to a License Transfer Transaction
The mid-1990s brought a wave of mergers and industry
consolidation fueled largely by the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,21 which, among other things,
abolished the limits on the number of stations any one entity could
control and substantially relaxed the limitations on concentration in
any particular geographic market. Broadcasters could now own a
greater number of stations nationally, and a greater share of the
broadcasting industry in any particular geographic market.
Along with increased merger activity came a change in the way
the industry engaged in the practice of time brokerage. Whereas time
brokerage agreements had typically been for fairly significant periods
of time, in the late-1990s the broadcasting industry started to witness
agreements that lasted for much shorter periods of time, often just a
year or less, and were typically attendant to a separate station
acquisition transaction. Such transactions can take months to
complete because the FCC requires time to review the formal license
transfer application. To get around the delay, broadcasters began
entering into short-term time brokerage agreements that would allow
the acquiring entity to take over certain key functions of the station
while the license transfer application was pending approval at the
FCC. Although such arrangements were essentially time brokerage
agreements, the new practice was given its own name and the local
marketing agreement was born.
20. Sewell, supra note 13, at 94.
21. Pub L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
9
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Broadcasting industry veteran, R. Steven Hicks, and his company
Capstar, which later became part of Clear Channel,22 are often
credited with having invented the new application of time brokerage
agreements. As described by journalist Alec Foege:
Clear Channel's use of LMAs was at the point of entering into
a contract to sell a station. The interval between the filing of a
sale/license transfer and its final FCC approval (usually four
to six months) was a risky operational period for both the
buyer and the seller. Since the impending sale of a station was
public information during this period, advertising sales often
dropped, staff sometimes left, and ratings sometimes faltered.
Short-term LMAs provided an opportunity for buyers and
sellers to enter into brief management agreements that
enabled the buyer to operate the station until the FCC
approved the final sale and transfer. This type of LMA was
generally a year or less in length. 23
3. Centerpiece of a Business Model
LMAs and their close cousins, JSAs, have also become widely
used in contexts beyond license transfers. For some broadcasters,
entering into cooperative agreements with competing stations has
become a central feature of their business model. Sinclair Broadcast
Group, for example, operates fifty-five stations, twelve of which it
operates through a local marketing agreement or an outsourcing
agreement. Of the twelve stations that Sinclair operates under a
cooperative arrangement with another licensee, ten are in markets
where Sinclair also owns television stations, 25 and of those ten
stations, six are owned by Cunningham Broadcasting,2 6 "a company
22. Diane Mermigas, AMFM Deal Just the Start; Merger with Clear Channel Could
Spur Other Radio Deals, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 11, 1999, at 20 (noting that AMFM,
Inc. acquired Capstar Broadcasting in 1999 and subsequently merged with Clear Channel
later that year).
23. ALEC FOEGE, RIGHT OF THE DIAL: THE RISE OF CLEAR CHANNEL AND THE
FALL OF COMMERCIAL RADIO 106 (Faber & Faber 1st ed. 2008).
24. SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP: TELEVISION STATIONS, http://www.sbgi.net/
business/all.shtml (last visited July 13, 2009).
25. Baltimore, MD; Nashville, TN; Columbus, OH; Asheville, NC; Birmingham, AL;
Dayton, OH; Charleston, WV; Paducah, KY; Cedar Rapids, IA; Charleston, SC. Id.
26. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5-6 (Mar. 4,
2009) (providing a list of stations operated by Sinclair, noting those owned by
Cunningham).
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owned, not coincidentally, by [the Sinclair CEO]'s mother."" The
oddly cozy relationship between the two companies has led some to
charge that Sinclair effectively operates Cunningham as a way to
circumvent the FCC's ownership restrictions, particularly because in
many of the markets in which Sinclair operates Cunningham's
stations, Sinclair would be prohibited from owning additional signals.
Indeed, Sinclair has attempted to acquire Cunningham on three
occasions, but the FCC has blocked the transaction each time;28 the
FCC has also fined Sinclair for circumventing ownership rules in the
past."
Similar charges have been lobbed against Nexstar Broadcasting
Group ("Nexstar"). Headquartered in Irving, Texas, Nexstar owns or
operates fifty-seven stations, twenty-three of which it operates
pursuant to a "management services agreement,"o and one Nexstar
station which is operated by Newport Television pursuant to an
LMA." Of the twenty-three stations operated under a management
services agreement, sixteen are in markets where Nexstar also owns
stations," and of those sixteen stations, fifteen are owned by Mission
Broadcasting, Inc. ("Mission").3 Like Sinclair and Cunningham,
Mission and Nexstar have a curiously close relationship. In its annual
report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Nexstar
explains that although Mission is "100% owned by an independent
third party," because so many of Mission's stations are operated
under LMAs with Nexstar and Nexstar has guaranteed a substantial
amount of Mission's debt and holds various options to acquire
27. Bill McConnell & John Higgins, Sinclair Under Siege: Station chief takes a stand,
incites fight over Big Media, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1.
28. Re: Applications for Assignment of License/Transfer of Control of Television
Stations, WTTE(TV), Columbus, Ohio, WNUV(TV), Baltimore, Maryland, WRGT(TV),
Dayton, Ohio, WTAT(TV), Charleston, South Carolina, WVAH(TV), Charleston, West
Virginia, Letter, 19 FCC Rcd. 3897 (2004).
29. In the Matter of Edwin L. Edwards, Sr. (Transferor) and Carolyn C. Smith
(Transferee); For Consent to the Transfer of Control of Glencairn, Ltd., Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Notice of Apparent Liability, 16 FCC Rcd. 22236,22251 (2001).
30. Nexstar describes a "management services agreement" as "a contract under
which we provide services to a station owned and operated by an independent third
party." NEXSTAR, Stations, http://www.nexstar.tv/index.php?option=com-content&view
=article&id=301&Itemid=2 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
31. WLYH-TV, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Id.
32. Wilkes-Barre, PA; Springfield, MO; Rochester, NY; Peoria, IL; Amarillo, TX;
Rockford, IL; Monroe, LA; Erie, PA; Joplin, MO; Wichita Falls, TX; Lubbock, TX; Terre
Haute, IN; Abeline, TX; Utica, NY; Billings, MT; San Angelo, TX. Id.
33. Station Index, MISSION BROADCASTING STATIONS, http://www.stationindex.com
/tv/by-owner/Mission+Broadcasting (last visited July 14, 2009).
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Mission's stations, generally accepted accounting practices for
publicly traded companies require Nexstar to report Mission's
financial performance as if it were a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Nexstar.34
As with the unconventional Sinclair/Cunningham relationship, the
close financial ties between Nexstar and Mission have led to at least
one complaint that Mission is merely a holding entity for Nexstar so
that it may own multiple stations in markets where it would violate
the FCC's ownership caps if it were to hold the licenses of multiple
stations directly.35
III. Communications Law Treatment
As the guardian of the public's electromagnetic spectrum, the
FCC is the primary regulatory body charged with overseeing and
licensing radio and television broadcasters. As such, the agency has
opined on the practice of cooperative agreements and has, over time,
developed polices relating to their implementation, the basic
parameters of which are discussed here. Broadly speaking, the FCC
considers cooperative agreements through two regulatory paradigms:
(1) limits on the number of broadcasting properties that any one
person or entity can control; and (2) the application and review
process for transfers of broadcast licenses.
This section first describes the overarching policy objectives that
underlie the FCC's analytical framework for ownership issues, and
then considers the ownership cap and license control considerations.
A. FCC Policy Objectives
The FCC's authority comes from the Communications Act of
1934 which, broadly, allows the FCC to manage the public spectrum
such that it "serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity."36
In considering the regulatory framework applied to cooperative
agreements, it is useful and appropriate to look to the FCC's
ownership guidelines since LMAs and similar agreements effectively
34. Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc., Annual Report (form 10-K), at 5 (Dec. 31,
2008).
35. Allison Romano, Cable America Challenges Licenses, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Jan. 9, 2006, at 5 (quoting Cable America's letter to the FCC: "Nexstar and Mission,
through a complex web of contracts and operating arrangements, have engaged in a
subterfuge that violates federal law").
36. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1997).
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give the broker ownership-like control over certain functions of the
licensee's operations.
In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act" which,
among other things, changed the limits on the number of stations that
any one entity could own or control. It also required the FCC to
engage in periodic reviews of those rules to identify how well they
accomplish the Commission's stated policy objectives and whether
changes may be necessary to ensure that the rules remain effective."
As described in the Commission's 2002 biennial review39 and
reaffirmed in its 2006 review,40 the FCC seeks to achieve three
principal overarching policy objectives through its ownership
regulations: diversity, competition, and localism.41
1. Diversity
The FCC seeks to promote five types of diversity: (1) viewpoint;
(2) program; (3) outlet; (4) source; and (5) minority and female
ownership diversity.
Viewpoint diversity is based on the premise that "a diverse and
robust marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our democracy" and
that communications policy should aim to maximize the number of
voices in the media marketplace. 43  The Commission takes the
position that viewpoint diversity is best measured by looking to news,
information, and public affairs programming, as opposed to
entertainment programming, because "it relates most directly to the
37. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
38. 47 C.F.R. § 303(h) requires the FCC to periodically review its broadcast
ownership rules to "determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public
interest as a result of competition," and to modify or repeal those rules which it deems no
longer necessary to preserve or advance the public interest. The original
Telecommunications Act called for the FCC to perform a biennial review of its ownership
rules, but Congress changed the frequency of the review in 2004; the FCC is now required
to complete its review of ownership rules every four years. See 2004 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004). The FCC recently began its
2010 review. See Media Bureau Announces Agenda and Participants for Initial Media
Ownership Workshops and Seeks Comment on Structuring of 2010 Media Ownership
Review Proceeding, Public Notice, FCC DA No. 09-2209 (Oct. 21, 2009).
39. In the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620 para. 17 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Order].
40. In the Matter of 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and
Order on Reconsideration, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 para. 9 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 Order].
41. Id., at para. 9; 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 17.
42. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 18.
43. Id. at para. 19.
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Commission's core policy objective of facilitating robust democratic
discourse in the media.""
Similar to viewpoint diversity, program diversity refers to
diversity among specific formats or genres of programming. In
television, this might include a consideration of the balance among
dramas, comedies, reality programming, and the like, while in radio, it
includes a consideration of various music formats, such as top-forty,
rock, jazz, news, and so forth.45 The FCC has concluded that this type
of diversity "is best achieved by reliance on competition among
delivery systems rather than by government regulation."4 That is, the
FCC believes that competition between satellite, cable, and
traditional broadcasting stations in the television realm, and
competition between AM, FM, HD,47  satellite, and online
broadcasting in the radio realm will foster a rich and diverse
programming landscape.
Outlet diversity refers to the multiplicity of independent owners
in a particular market. The FCC has traditionally considered outlet
diversity a means towards achieving viewpoint and program diversity
on the theory that the more independent owners in a market, the
more likely those owners will present competing viewpoints and
programming to the community.48 Since outlet diversity is susceptible
to regulation using objective criteria-the number of stations any one
owner controls-"[r]egulating the ownership of outlets to achieve
[other diversity objectives] is far preferable to attempting to engineer
44. Id. at para. 32.
45. Id. at para. 36.
46. Id. at para. 37.
47. "HD Radio" is the trade name associated with the FCC-approved standard for
digital radio transmission, known more formally as "in-band on-channel" or "IBOC."
Stations transmitting IBOC signals have the capability of delivering multiple programming
streams to listeners called "multicasts," thereby increasing the number of stations
available to listeners. Considering HD multicasts poses special challenges for regulators.
See HD RADIO, How does it work?, http://www.hdradio.com/how-does-hd-digital-radio
.work.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). To hear the HD signals, listeners must have a
special HD-equipped receiver, which are not nearly as prolific as standard AM or FM
receivers, meaning that only a portion of the market can hear the additional stations.
Moreover, not all stations broadcast HD multicasts, but many intend to in the near future.
Although the FCC has yet to specifically consider multicasting in the context of its
ownership reviews, given the increased proliferation of stations using IBOC since its last
ownership review, it would be unsurprising if multicasting makes an appearance during
the 2010 review. "HD Radio" is a registered trademark of iBiquity Digital Corporation.
48. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 38.
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outcomes directly" because the FCC need not make subjective
judgments about program content and the diversity thereof.49
Source diversity is similar to outlet diversity in that it refers to
diversity in programming suppliers, but unlike viewpoint, program,
and outlet diversity, which focus on the downstream supply chain-
that is, from broadcasters to audiences-source diversity focuses on
the upstream supply of programming from producers and distributors
to broadcasters.so The FCC has found that promoting diversity on the
upstream side of the supply chain fosters diversity on the downstream
side, which ultimately benefits viewers and listeners." Most of the
FCC's efforts in source diversity have been in the television industry,
where its rules once restricted networks from programming certain
hours of the day by requiring local stations to program those hours
locally or buy programming from syndicators52 and prevented
networks from having a financial interest in program producers.3
Both rules were subsequently abolished.54
Although the FCC acknowledges that source diversity was once
an important policy objective, it concedes that, due in part to
technological changes and the proliferation of new media distribution
channels, "[t]he record before [it] does not support a conclusion that
source diversity should be an objective of [its] broadcast ownership
rules.""
Finally, minority and female ownership diversity, which has
historically been an important FCC policy objective," remains a key
concern for the Commission.
2. Competition
The second of the FCC's stated objectives for ownership policy is
competition, which, as the FCC notes, has been a "basic tenet of
communications policy" since the government first began regulating
49. Id. at para. 39.
50. Id. at para. 42.
51. Id.
52. In re Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
546, 547 (1995) (repealing the FCC's "prime time access rule").
53. In re Review of Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Report and Order, 10
FCC Rcd. 12165 (1995) (repealing the FCC's "fin-syn" rules).
54. See supra notes 54-55.
55. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 43.
56. Id. at para. 46.
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communications." Some critics have argued that competition
enforcement is best left in the hands of the antitrust regulators," but
the FCC has taken the position that promoting economic competition
serves to advance its "separate policy goal of protecting competition
in the marketplace of ideas."S9 Specifically, the FCC has recognized
that antitrust enforcers typically focus only on price competition and,
as such, are traditionally concerned with its impact on advertising
markets, whereas the FCC's inquiry is consistent with its statutory
mandate, on the public interest, and the ability of its licensees to serve
the needs of their communities.' Put simply, while antitrust
regulators are concerned with consolidation's impact on advertisers,
the FCC is concerned with its impact on the public." Recognizing
that, in many cases, traditional antitrust principles may serve to
achieve both economic and viewpoint competition, the FCC notes
that in other cases, particularly those in smaller markets with fewer
media outlets, stiff adherence to them "would unreasonably threaten
viewpoint diversity even if they would not, under standard antitrust
theory, result in competitive harms." 62
Unlike antitrust enforcement of media transactions, which has
traditionally focused on competitive effects in the advertising
market," the FCC's analysis of competition has recognized that the
economic models for broadcasters are changing, and that traditional
media entities-radio and television stations-are today facing
intense competition by other services that, in addition to advertising
57. Id. at para. 54.
58. 2006 Order, supra note 40, at note 451 (noting Fox's argument that the FCC's
prohibition on one entity controlling multiple broadcast networks was unnecessary
because "antitrust review can address the Commission's concerns"); 2002 Order, supra
note 39, at para. 210 ("Most commenters proposing elimination of the [local television
ownership] rule believe that antitrust authorities will protect against any public interest
harms that may result from combined ownership of multiple television stations in a
market.").
59. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 58.
60. Id., at para. 65 (quoting Fed. Radio Comm'n, Second Ann. Rpt. 169-70 (1928))
(footnote omitted).
61. Id. at para. 65 (quoting Fed. Radio Comm'n, Second Ann. Rpt. 169-70 (1928))
(footnote omitted). Antitrust regulators typically take the position that promoting
advertiser welfare is consistent with the public interest because the increased costs of
broadcast advertising attributable to a particular transaction or agreement likely would be
passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices charged by the advertiser. See
Stucke & Grunes, infra note 121, at 275 n. 117.
62. Id. at para. 59.
63. See generally Raycom Competitive Impact Statement, infra note 119; Bain
Competitive Impact Statement, infra note 119.
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revenues, receive payments directly from consumers, such as cable,
satellite, and broadband services (collectively "multichannel video
programming distributors" or "MPVDs").64 Moreover, unlike
broadcasters, whose programming is a public good, MVPDs and the
channels they carry can "extract direct payments from viewers based
partly on viewers' strength of preference for different programming"
through constructing "tiers" of related channels; consumers pay
different prices based on the tiers to which they subscribe. In
recognition of the changing competitive landscape, the FCC
concluded that when analyzing markets comprised of both free over-
the-air broadcasters, as well as subscription services, its analysis is
properly founded not only on audience share but also on advertising
markets.66
3. Localism
Like competition, localism and ensuring that local broadcasters
respond to the needs of their communities have historically been a
focus of communications regulation. Indeed, the Communications
Act of 1934 directs the FCC to "make such distribution of licenses,
frequencies, hours of operation, and power among the several States
and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same."6
To assess localism, the Commission relies "on two measures: the
selection of programming responsive to local needs and interests, and
local news quantity and quality."69
B. Local Ownership Rules
Taking into account the broad policy objectives described above,
the FCC has constructed a series of bright-line rules pertaining to
various media ownership combinations. For example, the FCC's
newspaper cross-ownership rules place certain restrictions on a single
entity owning newspaper properties along with certain broadcasting
outlets,o while another rule prohibits one entity from owning two
64. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 61.
65. Id. at para. 62-63.
66. Id. at para. 64.
67. Id. at para. 74.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b).
69. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 78.
70. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d).
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broadcasting networks." Of particular significance to this article are
the limitations on the number of radio or television stations that a
single owner can control in a particular market. This section first
describes the current ownership limitations and then considers how,
and to what extent, stations operated under LMAs and TBAs or
stations between which there exists a JSA are counted towards those
limitations.
1. Current Numerical Limits
The current ownership limits for radio are best summarized in
chart form:
Total Number of Upper Limit on Stations Any One
Stations in the Person or Entity Can Control"
Market Total Same Service"
45 or more 8 5
30-44 7 4
15-29 6 4
14 or fewer" 5 3
Unlike radio, with the numerical limits displayed above, dual
ownership of television stations within the same market is generally
prohibited unless the stations' primary signals do not overlap, or if (1)
not more than one of the jointly-owned stations is ranked among the
top four stations in the market, as determined by Nielsen Media
Research; and (2) there are at least eight remaining independently-
owned stations in the market.
The FCC's radio-television cross-ownership rule provides that
one entity may control or own up to two commercial television
stations, provided that such ownership does not violate the local
television ownership rule, as described above, and only one
71. Id. § 73.3555(e).
72. In counting the number of stations in a particular market, the FCC includes all
full-power AM, FM, commercial, and noncommercial stations. Id. § 73.3555(a)(1)(i).
73. Id. § 73.3555(a)(1).
74. "Service" refers to AM and FM.
75. Notwithstanding the numerical limits, "no person or single entity (or entities
under common control) may have a cognizable interest in more than 50% of the [stations]
in such market unless the combination of stations comprises not more than one AM and
one FM station." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(iv).
76. Id. § 73.3555(b).
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commercial radio station, unless, after a proposed acquisition, there
would remain a specified number of "independently owned media
voices" in the market."
If at least twenty independently owned media voices would
remain after a proposed acquisition, then a single entity or person
may control no more than: (1) two commercial television stations and
six commercial radio stations; or (2) one commercial television station
and seven commercial radio stations." If at least ten independently
owned media voices would remain after a proposed transaction, then
a single entity or person may control no more than two commercial
television stations and four commercial radio stations.79
The cross-ownership rule is applied in addition to the local radio
and television ownership rules-that is, the configurations set forth in
the cross-ownership rule are permitted only to the extent that the
owner or controlling entity would not run afoul of the radio and
television ownership rules set forth above.
2. Attribution
Generally, the FCC's attribution rules "seek to identify those
interests in or relationships to licensees that confer on their holders a
degree of influence or control such that the holders have a realistic
potential to affect the programming decisions of licensees or other
core operating functions."80 The FCC began attributing radio LMAs
and TBAs in 1992, in response to the simultaneous relaxation of
ownership rules."
In considering the issue, the FCC recognized that joint ventures
among broadcasters-even those operating in the same market-may
have advantageous or procompetitive effects, but cautioned that such
agreements among competitors may "undermine [the FCC's]
77. Id. § 73.3555(c)(2). 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c)(3) provides a formula by which to
determine the number of media voices in the market. In brief, the formula considers the
number of broadcast stations, newspapers, and cable systems that are generally available
to consumers within the DMA or FCC-designed community of license.
78. Id. § 73.3555(c)(2)(i).
79. Id. § 73.3555(c)(2)(ii).
80. In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution
of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests; Review of the Commission's Regulations and
Policies Affecting Investment in the Broadcast Industry; Reexamination of the
Commission's Cross-Interest Policy, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 12559 para. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Attribution Order].
81. In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2755
para 65 (1992).
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continuing interest in broadcast competition and diversity."8 2
Accordingly, the Commission elected to count brokered stations
against the broker's ownership limit if the broker provides more than
fifteen percent of the station's broadcast hours.8 1 "In short," stated
the FCC, "we will not permit a local station to substantially broker a
station in its market which it could not own under our .. .rules."'
In 1995, the FCC revisited its attribution rules, but declined to
reconsider its position on radio TBAs.s' Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law, prompting the
Commission to consider whether to adopt an attribution policy for
television TBAs that echoed its radio TBA attribution policy. 6  In
1999, after a lengthy fact-finding and public comment period, the
FCC decided to require attribution just as it had done for radio,
attributing television TBAs to brokers that provide more than fifteen
percent of a station's programming.8
The FCC's current attribution rule provides that a radio or
television station operated pursuant to an LMA or TBA is
attributable to the broker if it provides the brokered station with
"more than fifteen percent" of its programming.89 Similarly, the
attribution rule provides that a broker who sells more than fifteen
82. 7 FCC Rcd. 2755 at para 64.
83. Id. at para 65.
84. Id.
85. In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution
of Broadcast Interests; Review of the Commission's Regulations and Policies Affecting
Investment in the Broadcast Industry; Reexamination of the commission's Cross-Interest
Policy, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 3606 para. 95 (1995).
86. In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution
of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests; Review of the Commission's Regulations and
Policies Affecting Investment in the Broadcast Industry; Reexamination of the
Commission's Cross-Interest Policy, Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11
F.C.C.R. 19895 para. 8 (1996).
87. The FCC went beyond its usual solicitation of comments and sought "certain
factual information regarding the terms and characteristics of [television TBAs]."
Specifically, the Commission asked for information pertaining to the identity of each
station involved in a TBA, the name and rank of the market affected, the degree to which
the stations' signals overlap, commencement and termination dates for the TBA, the
percentage of each brokered stations' time that is programmed by the broker, network
affiliation, audience share, and a statement of "efficiencies or public interest benefits"
realized as a result of the TBA. Commission Seeks Further Information Regarding
Television LMAs, Public Notice, 12 FCC Rcd. 8211 (1997).
88. 1999 Attribution Order, supra note 80 at para. 83.
89. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555, note 2()(1)-(2).
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percent of the commercial availabilities on a radio station pursuant to
a JSA must count that station toward its ownership limit.90
The following chart summarizes the current attribution rules:
Locatl Miarketing&
.Jolint Safles
Type of Stantlon fime1 Brokerage-,
.lvio Attributable Attributable(more than 15 %) (more than 15%)
Television AtrbtbeNot Attributable(more than 15%)
Note, however, that unlike the LMA/TBA attribution provisions
which apply to both radio and television stations, the attribution
provision for JSAs applies only to radio stations," leaving television
stations to enter into agreements to jointly sell airtime without any
impact under the FCC's attribution rules.
In 2004, the FCC sought comment on its rules and policies
concerning television JSAs, essentially asking whether it should treat
television JSAs as it treats radio JSAs.92 In its notice, the FCC
recognized that a JSA arrangement between two stations wherein the
licensee receives a fixed payment regardless of advertising sales or
audience share, essentially "transfers all market risk from the licensee
to the broker."93 Moreover, the FCC expressed concerns that joint
advertising sales may adversely affect competition, since two market
* * 94participants can jointly make pricing and output decisions.
As of this writing, the rulemaking remains open, and television
JSAs remain unattributable.
C. Transfer of Control
The other principal area of FCC oversight in connection with
cooperative agreements concerns the prohibition on transferring
90. Id., note 2(k)(1).
91. Id., note 2(k).
92. In the Matter of Rules and Policies Concerning Attribution of Joint Sales
Agreements In Local Television Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd.
15238 (2004).
93. Id. at para. 13.
94. Id. at para. 15.
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control of an FCC license to another party without the Commission's
consent. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) provides, in pertinent part:
No construction permit or station license, or any rights
thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed of in
any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly,
or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such
permit or license, to any person except upon application to the
Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the
public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
thereby.
Thus, a cooperative agreement may be unlawful if the agreement
amounts to a de facto transfer of control over a particular station. As
evidenced by the earlier discussion of the nature and scope of the
most commonly utilized cooperative agreements, most such
agreements give the broker at least some degree of authority over the
station; the question, then, is to what degree may a licensee delegate
certain operational functions to a broker without being deemed to
have abdicated its control in violation of Section 310(d). Or, put
differently, how much control must a licensee transfer to the broker
to be liable for engaging in a de facto transfer of control without the
Commission's consent.
In 1995, Michael E. Lewyn undertook a comprehensive review of
the FCC's decisions concerning time brokerage agreements and
summarized the factors the FCC considers in determining whether a
particular agreement runs afoul of Section 310(d).95 Lewyn concluded
that the Commission's "likes and dislikes" fall into four broad
categories: (1) finances; (2) personnel; (3) programming; and (4)
other station management issues. He explained that "a licensee may
delegate day-to-day control over [each of these four] areas, as long as
the licensee continues to set policies guiding station operations."97 As
Lewyn observed-and it remains true today-the FCC has no bright-
line rules as to what constitutes an excessive transfer of control in
connection with a cooperative agreement. Although stations are
95. See Michael E. Lewyn, When is Time Brokerage A Transfer of Control? The
FCC's Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (1995).
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 14.
98. Id. at 45.
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required to include a certification statement in all attributable
cooperative agreements that the licensee shall maintain ultimate
control over the station,99 the FCC has offered little guidance, aside
from its adjudications, on what constitutes acceptable delegation of
control.
As a practical matter, most licensees retain ultimate financial
control over their station by maintaining the station's coffers and
extracting a periodic fee from the broker for use of the station's
frequency; similarly, most licensees maintain ultimate control over
their station's programming by including contractual provisions in the
agreement that give the licensee unfettered veto power over
programming that, in its sole judgment, is contrary to the public
interest, convenience, or necessity1 0 Most licensees also eliminate a
substantial portion of their workforce, retaining only those staffers
necessary to perform the station's core management functions; the
station's administrative and operational functions are typically
performed by the broker's staff. Finally, licensees typically
substantially shrink the size of their physical plant, collocating most
operational functions of the station in the broker's facility.
IV. Antitrust Treatment
Although competition is one of the FCC's stated policy
objectives, as discussed previously, it has noted that its examination of
99. Note 2(j)(3) to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 provides:
...every time brokerage agreement of the type described in this Note shall
be undertaken only pursuant to a signed written agreement that shall
contain a certification by the licensee . . . of the brokered station
verifying it maintains ultimate control over the station's facilities,
including, specifically, control over station finances, personnel and
programming, and by the brokering station that the agreement complies
with [applicable FCC rules].
Note 2(k)(2) provides a substantively identical provision for joint sales agreements.
100. See, e.g., Local Marketing Agreement by and among Community Television of
Colorado, LLC and KWGN, Inc., Oct. 6, 2008, para 5.2 (copy of redacted version obtained
from the FCC Reference Information Center) ("Notwithstanding any contrary provision
contained in this Agreement, and consistent with Licensee's obligations pursuant to the
Communications Laws, Licensee shall have the right, without any liability or obligation to
Programmer, to delete any material contained in any programming or commercial matter
furnished by Programmer for broadcast over the Station that Licensee determines in good
faith is unsuitable for broadcast or the broadcast of which Licensee believes in good faith
would be contrary to the public interest. Licensee shall have the right, without any
liability or obligation to Programmer, to broadcast Licensee's own programming in place
of such deleted material.").
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competition issues is largely a proxy for the Commission's other, less
readily measured objectives, such as viewpoint and program
diversity.'or Indeed, the Commission has recognized that even if it
approves an LMA, the Justice Department may still object on
antitrust grounds,102 and the Antitrust Division has recognized that
some cooperative agreements may raise antitrust issues.' 3
A. Competitive Issues in Agreements Between Broadcasters
Because the cooperative agreements discussed in this article
involve agreements between or among competitors, there exists the
possibility that such arrangements may restrain or foreclose
competition in various aspects of the parties' businesses. Free
competition is the cornerstone of a market-based economy, the goal
of which is to promote consumer welfare by enhancing efficiencies in
the use and allocation of scarce resources, the development of new
and improved products and services, and the development of new
techniques and organizational principles that put economic resources
to better use. Put simply, competition aims to ensure that resources
are properly allocated within a marketplace so as to maximize
welfare.
Competition in the broadcasting industry takes place on several
levels. Broadcasters compete among themselves for audiences
through the distribution of programming, and for advertisers, who
seek to reach those audiences with their messages. The greater the
audience, the more a broadcaster can charge for its advertising time.
Thus, a rational broadcaster will seek to garner the greatest possible
share of audience through the production or acquisition of
programming that it believes is of interest to the community it serves.
As a result, broadcasters collectively have an incentive to produce a
diverse array of programming that targets a broad spectrum of
101. See supra Part III.A
102. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n
to J. Dominic Monahan, Esq., 6 FCC Rcd. 1867 (1991) ("while we may approve a time
brokerage agreement, the Justice Department may determine that the enforcement of
antitrust laws is necessary to remedy an anticompetitive arrangement that may occur as a
result of the implementation of a time brokerage agreement").
103. Lawrence R. Fullerton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Address to Business Development Associates 1997 Antitrust Conference: Current Issues
in Radio Station Merger Analysis (Oct. 21, 1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/8210.pdf (noting that local marketing and time
brokerage agreements "may [] raise [15 U.S.C. § 1] issues").
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interests. Competition for viewers and advertisers thus leads to
diverse programming options that ultimately benefit consumers.
When competing broadcasters merge or enter into an agreement
to combine or share certain functions, there exists the potential that
some degree of competition will be restrained or foreclosed entirely.
For example, a station that enters into a joint sales agreement with a
competitor may reduce or eliminate the competition for viewers and
advertisers that takes place between those two stations, potentially
resulting in higher advertising rates, which, in turn, could mean higher
prices to consumers for the goods or services offered by the
advertiser. Similarly, a station that enters into a shared service
agreement whereby one station agrees to produce another station's
local newscasts could result in lower quality news content because the
two stations' news departments no longer have to compete to be the
first to cover a breaking news story, to offer greater breadth of
stories, or to offer more in-depth coverage of those stories that are
covered.
Agreements that combine the sales and programming functions of
at least two entities-namely time brokerage and local marketing
agreements-offer the most risk because they may restrain or
foreclose competition in both content and advertising domains and
are, arguably, equivalent to a merger of the two broadcasters.1
Because the station personnel responsible for producing unique
programming, or acquiring content from third-party distributors,
perform that function for both stations, the competition that once
existed between the two stations-to produce the highest-quality
programming or to acquire the most popular shows-is reduced.
B. The Antitrust Laws
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.""o' Despite the
Act's sweeping language, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
only "unreasonable" restraints-that is, those restraints with
104. The merger-like qualities of cooperative agreements suggest that an antitrust
merger analysis may be appropriate. Despite the apparent functional equivalency
between a merger and a typical cooperative agreement, the principal antitrust statute that
proscribes anticompetitive mergers appears inapposite. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18, is limited to transactions that involve the acquisition of "stock or other share
capital." As cooperative agreements are generally structured using a fee-for-service
model, as discussed in part II.A., supra, they do not fall within the scope of the merger
statute.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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weightier anticompetitive than procompetitive effects-are illegal."
The reasonableness of most restraints is judged under the flexible
"rule of reason" standard, which calls upon the fact-finder to consider
the circumstances surrounding a particular practice, including the
business context in which the restraint arises; the history, nature, and
effect of the restraint; and whether the parties involved in the
restraint have market power. o
The first step of a rule of reason analysis is to define the relevant
markets in which the competitive effects may be realized.o' A
relevant market definition has two components: (1) geographic
dimension; and (2) a product dimension. A geographic market is
generally defined as an "area of effective competition" and is "not
subject to definition by metes and bounds," but rather, "it is the
locale in which consumers of a product or service can turn for
alternative sources of supply."no With respect to the product market
dimension, the key inquiry is "whether the products at issue are
'reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes'
taking into account their "price, use and qualities.'"" In essence, the
relevant market question aims to determine where consumers may
turn if prices rise.112 Once the relevant markets have been
determined, one can endeavor to balance the competitive effects
within the relevant markets to determine whether the anticompetitive
aspects of a particular transaction or business arrangement are
outweighed by its procompetitive benefits.
Some restraints have been found to be consistently so "manifestly
anticompetitive" and without "any redeeming value" that they are
deemed per se illegal, without any balancing of competitive effects
required."' Among those restraints that are typically considered per
106. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49-50 (1977).
107. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007)
(citations omitted).
108. EARL W. KINTER, JOSEPH P. BAUER, WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 10.1 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Re/Max Int'l v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
111. KINTER, et. al., supra note 108 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)).
112. Id.
113. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).
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se violations are agreements among competitors to jointly set prices,
output levels, or other material terms of trade."4
C. Applying Antitrust Law to Cooperative Agreements
As noted, the Antitrust Division has recognized that cooperative
agreements between broadcasters may raise antitrust issues."'
Indeed, the very notion of an agreement between competitors in a
particular market-particularly agreements that relate to the sale of
those competitors' principal product-draws suspicion. An
agreement which simply provides for the joint selling of advertising
time, or jointly making decisions about advertising sales or
programming, without any provisions that may reasonably generate
procompetitive efficiencies, may be properly viewed as a per se
violation of the antitrust laws."' But because of the long history of
broadcasters entering into cooperative agreements along with the
FCC's recognition that such arrangements, at least historically, have
the potential to advance the public interest,"' it is likely that most
such agreements are properly analyzed under the rule of reason.
1. Candidate Markets
A rule-of-reason analysis requires a balancing of the
anticompetitive effects and the procompetitive benefits in the
relevant antitrust markets. The first step in a rule-of-reason analysis
is, thus, to define the relevant markets."'
2. Geographic Markets
In the context of the broadcasting industry, the Antitrust Division
has typically alleged geographic market definitions that are consistent
with the market definitions prescribed by the dominant audience
measurement services-Arbitron for radio and Nielsen for
television."' Because these geographic market constructs are based
114. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano, Inc.
v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam).
115. See Fullerton, supra note 103.
116. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
117. See Part II.B.1., supra.
118. KITNER et al., supra note 108.
119. See Competitive Impact Statement at 4-5, United States v. Raycom Media, Inc.,
Civil No. 08-01510, (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/cases/f236600/236618.htm [hereinafter Raycom Competitive Impact Statement] (using a
"DMA" to define a television station's geographic market); Competitive Impact
Statement at 7-8, United States v. Bain Capital, LLC, Civil No. 08-00245 (D.D.C. Feb. 13,
27
on the premise that they are roughly coextensive with the coverage
areas of the broadcasting stations operating within them, it is
reasonable to assume that market participants within each market-
either Arbitron's MSA or Nielsen's DMA-are limited to the
available options in that market when selecting a broadcaster. Any
anticompetitive harm associated with an agreement between
competing broadcasters would, thus, be confined to a particular MSA
or DMA. Accordingly, using such market definitions as geographic
markets in the context of an antitrust analysis is appropriate.
3. Product Markets
Broadcasters operate within several distinct "markets."
Fundamentally, broadcasting is characterized as a two-sided market,
with audiences on one side and advertisers on the other.20 Ancillary
to these core markets are two subsidiary markets: (1) the market for
viewpoints, sometimes characterized as the "marketplace of ideas";121
and (2) the market for carriage. Each of these candidate markets is
discussed below:
(1) Audiences. Perhaps the most visible competitive setting for
broadcasters is in the quest for audience share. Radio and television
stations spend tremendous resources on creative marketing
campaigns designed to increase the number of people, and the
amount of time those people spend, consuming their programming.
But to most broadcasters, merely achieving a sizeable audience is of
little value; to generate revenue, broadcasters sell airtime to
advertisers that seek to convey messages to the broadcasters'
audiences. Broadcasters, in a sense, "create" audiences and then
"sell" them, for brief periods of time, through the sale of
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100/230166.htm [hereinafter Bain
Competitive Impact Statement] (using Arbitron's "Metro Survey Area" to define
geographic markets in the radio industry).
120. See Paul Seabright & Helen Weeds, Competition and Market Power in
Broadcasting: Where are the Rents?, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BROADCASTING MARKETS: EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY AND CHALLENGES FOR POLICY
47, 62 (Paul Seabright & Jirgen von Hagen eds., 2007) ("Advertiser-funded broadcasting
is one example of what economists describe as a two-sided market. A broadcaster shows
attractive programmes to build an audience; access to this audience is sold to advertisers,
thus generating revenues out of which broadcasts funded. The two sides of the market -
viewers and advertisers - are interdependent and the broadcaster must get both sides on
board").
121. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 257 (2001).
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advertising.122 Thus, for the vast majority of broadcasters, audiences
are not an end themselves, but rather a means to an end: the sale of
advertising.12 Broadcasters, then, traditionally choose formats and
programming aimed at attracting a certain demographic-
traditionally characterized by age and gender-that is believed to be
of interest to particular advertisers.12 4
Additionally, broadcast audiences typically do not pay for access
to content. Unlike cable networks and other forms of pay media,
where viewers pay a fee for access, broadcasters' signals are made
available free, over the air, to anyone with a radio or television.
There is, thus, no trade or commerce between a broadcaster and its
audience.
Since the audience is, then, merely a mechanism to attract
advertisers, and because there is generally no commercial transaction
between broadcasters and their audiences, it is unsurprising that the
Antitrust Division has never alleged a market for audiences, in favor
of other, more commercially relevant markets.
(2) Advertisers. The market for advertising is the primary market
that the Antitrust Division has typically alleged in enforcement
actions against broadcasters.125 In its most recent television case, the
122. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Language Barriers: First Amendment
Constraints on Defining an Antitrust Market by a Broadcast's Language, and its
Implications for Audiences, Competition, and Democracy, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 407, 415
(2008) (citing JAMES G. WEBSTER & PATRICIA PHALEN, THE MASS AUDIENCE:
REDISCOVERING THE DOMINANT MODEL xiii (1997)) (footnote omitted).
123. The exception being noncommercial broadcasters which aim not to sell
advertising, but rather, to disseminate information to the public and give the public a
voice. See, e.g., CPB: Goals and Objectives, http://www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/goals/
goalsandobjectives/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2009) ("The fundamental purpose of public
service media is to provide programs and services that inform, enlighten, and enrich the
public").
124. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE
FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 173-74 (5th Ed. 2001) ("Strictly speaking, commercial
broadcasters sell time that is used for dissemination of advertising messages. In actuality,
though, what is sold is access to the thoughts and emotions of people in the audience.
Companies selling beer prefer to buy time on sports-events programs, whereas toy and
cereal manufacturers prefer time on children's shows").
125. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 8-12, United States v. Raycom Media, Inc., Civil No.
08-01510 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f236600
/236613.htm [hereinafter Raycom Complaint]; Complaint at para. 29-32, United States v.
Bain Capital, LLC, Civil No. 08-00245 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100/230167.htm [hereinafter Bain Complaint];
Complaint at para. 12-15, United States v. Univision Commc'ns., Inc., Civil No. 03-00758
(D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800/200878.htm;
Complaint para. 10-14, United States v. News Corp., Ltd., Civil No. 01-00771 (D.D.C.
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Antitrust Division noted that many advertisers find local television
broadcasting to be a unique advertising medium, distinct from other
forms of local advertising, such as the Internet, radio, newspapers,
and local out-of-home advertising (billboards, bus benches, etc); it
also recognized that local advertising on cable television is not a
reasonable substitute for local broadcast television advertising
because cable networks, even in aggregate, fail to deliver a
comparable audience.'26
The Antitrust Division alleged that because local broadcast
television advertising serves unique needs, if the price of such
advertising were to increase, although a few advertisers might defect
to other forms of promotion, an insufficient number would defect so
as to make the price increase unprofitable.'27 The sale of local
television advertising is, therefore, a relevant antitrust product
market.
Similarly, in the radio industry, the Antitrust Division has alleged
that local radio serves unique needs and many advertisers find it the
most cost-effective medium by which to reach their target audiences.
Like television, radio is sufficiently unique that although some
advertisers might switch to alternative marketing methods when faced
with a price increase, the majority would stay with radio, making a
price increase profitable.'28 The sale of local radio advertising is,
therefore, a relevant antitrust product market.
Local advertising on radio and television are desirable antitrust
markets not only because they are supported by empirical evidence,
but also because the effects of a transaction in that market are readily
susceptible to objective measurement. One can, for instance, observe
prices of advertising in a particular market both pre- and post-
transaction and compare the two in order to identify the potential
effects.
(3) Ideas and Viewpoints. Some have suggested that antitrust
regulators should consider the existence of a marketplace of ideas
April 11, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f8000/8039.htm; Complaint at
para. 9-15, United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 96-02563 (D.D.C. Nov.
12, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3700/3717.htm; see also Stucke &
Grunes, supra note 121, at 257 ("While there are a number of possible product markets,
the Antitrust Division has focused in its radio consent decrees on the mergers' impact on
advertisers and advertising rates").
126. Raycom Complaint, supra note 125, at paras. 9-10.
127. Raycom Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 119, at 4-5.
128. Bain Complaint, supra note 125, at para. 18.
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when reviewing broadcast-industry transactions; although the
Antitrust Division has never alleged such a market, former
government attorneys Maurice Stucke and Allen Grunes called for
the recognition of such a market,12 9 explaining that the legislative
history of the antitrust laws and significant antitrust precedent
support the notion of considering non-price competition in antitrust
analysis.130 They argue that including the marketplace of ideas in
media antitrust analyses is important because competition in the
media business extends beyond price since, in most instances,
consumers do not bear the burden of paying for programming
directly.13'
Stucke and Grunes identified several concerns that might
undermine the value of including the marketplace of ideas in
conventional antitrust analyses. 32  In particular, they note that
traditional antitrust constructs-market shares, concentration indices,
and the like-are not well suited to analyzing non-price competition.
Moreover, they note that larger media outlets may naturally tend
towards diversification, and enjoy greater resources to put towards
newsgathering, local program production, and to support protracted
litigation in support of their reportorial functions-e.g., First
Amendment challenges, Freedom of Information Act requests.
Although a free exchange of viewpoints is essential to a free and
open democracy, traditional antitrust constructs and metrics may be
ill suited to ensuring that the marketplace of ideas remains
competitive. As the FCC has recognized,'34 and Stucke and Grunes
129. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 121, at 257-58 ("We propose that the federal
antitrust agencies not confine their analyses to the merger's impact on advertising rates.
Instead, the agencies should look beyond a media merger's impact on advertising rates
and services and consider its impact on nonprice competition, which includes the
marketplace of ideas").
130. Id. at 273-74.
131. See id. at 279 ("It is well accepted, and a matter of everyday experience, that price
is not the sole measure of competition. Companies can and often do, compete on other
dimensions such as quality, service, and innovation. This is of particular importance in the
Internet, broadcast television, and radio industries, where the competition extends beyond
advertising prices"). Stucke and Grunes also argue that the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the underpinnings of the analytical framework of most merger investigations,
are ill suited to handle the media marketplace, where all of the offerings are strongly
branded and highly differentiated. Id. at 282-83.
132. Id. at 275.
133. Id. at 278.
134. 2002 Order, supra note 39, at para. 39.
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highlighted,35 measuring competition in the marketplace of ideas is
challenging, and susceptible to criticism since defining viewpoints and
ideas, and identifying diversity among them, requires a subjective,
rather than objective, analysis. The FCC's approach then, of
regulating source and program diversity as a means to achieve
viewpoint diversity, appears to be a sound approach. Perhaps
antitrust issues are best handled similarly: by ensuring competition in
the other relevant markets, competition in the marketplace of ideas
will follow.
(4) Carriage. The fourth candidate market is relevant only in the
television industry and exists only because of the Byzantine
regulatory framework in which the television industry operates.
Although an in-depth discussion is well beyond the scope of this
article, it is necessary to note that the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the "Cable Act")"' granted
television stations -a property right in their transmissions. With
respect to carriage of television signals on cable systems, the Cable
Act provides broadcasters with two options: (1) "must carry" by
which cable operators are required to carry the signal, but the
television station is entitled to no compensation; and (2)
"retransmission consent" by which the cable operator and television
station negotiate the terms of carriage,137 usually involving some sort
of compensation to the broadcaster. Each broadcaster is entitled to
make the selection triennially, but once it has chosen it cannot change
its mind for the duration of the three-year period. 138
As a practical matter, most broadcasters opt for retransmission
consent and, every three years, 9 enter into negotiations with cable
135. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 121, at 276-77.
136. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (Oct. 5, 1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325); see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable)
Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1305-06 (2008).
137. Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond? - Turner Broadcasting
v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (1997).
138. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B).
139. Sometimes less frequently. Many of the large television groups negotiate longer-
term contracts with major cable systems to avoid the transaction costs associated with
renegotiating the arrangement on a relatively frequent basis. Thus, although the stations
have a statutory right to renegotiate every three years, they give up that right, at least as to
certain cable operators, by virtue of a privately negotiated agreement for a longer term
than that provided by statute. See, e.g., John Hane, Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman, LLP, TVNewsDay Webinar, Retrans Agreeements: What the Other Side
Knows... That You May Not, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN (Feb. 4, 2009),
http://www.pillsburylaw.comlindex.cfm?pageid=36&itemid=6182 (noting that "[c]able,
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operators. Traditionally, most broadcasters have received in-kind
consideration from cable operators in the form of commercial time on
other channels, but recently broadcasters have begun demanding cash
payments, similar to the way cable networks are compensated.'o
The transition to a cash-based retransmission market has been
tumultuous.' Cable operators argue that they add value to the
television station by expanding its signal reach and exposing the
station to more viewers that, in turn, allow the broadcaster to
generate increased advertising revenue. Broadcasters, however, see
their programming as intrinsically valuable and believe they should
be compensated in a manner consistent with other programming
providers.142 As a result of this changing dynamic, the industry has
recently witnessed a number of contentious battles between television
groups and cable operators; sometimes these battles result in
"blackouts"-where certain local television stations are dropped from
a cable operator's lineup until the two sides can reach an
agreement.143
satellite and IPTV companies are engineering their agreements for a five-year horizon");
John M. Higgins, TV Grudge Match Reignites; Stations and Cable Brace for New
Retransmission Consent Talks, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 8.
140. See, e.g. Harry A. Jessell, 2010 Retrans Rallying Cry: 'A Buck a Sub,'
TVNEWSCHECK (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.tvnewscheck.comlarticles/2009/11/06/daily.7/;
Robert Marich, Broadcast's $1 Billion Pot of Gold: With Jan. 1 deadline approaching,
Cable Retransmission Deals could be lucrative or contentious, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Jul. 7, 2008, at 10.
141. See, e.g. Greg Schmidt, In Retrans, Stations Are Fighting for Lives,
TVNEWSCHECK (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2008/11/04/daily.9/
(noting that although some cable operators have "agreed to reasonable terms" for
retransmission consent agreements, "[a] few holdouts continue to wage quixotic rear-
guard actions").
142. See, e.g., John Eggerton, NAB Tells FCC Retrans Regime is Working: ACA says
Broadcasters are Leveraging Their Muscle at the Expense of Smaller Cable Operators,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, (Feb. 12,2008), available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com
/article/112432-NAB Tells_FCCRetransRegimeIsWorking.php (citing the National
Association of Broadcasters and Hearst-Argyle Television claiming that "some TV
stations are 20 times more popular than some cable channels"); John M. Higgins, CBS
Braces for Cable Showdown; Moonves Wants Retrans Fees for His Stations, But Can He
Deliver?, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 27,2006, at 10.
143. See, e.g., Linda Moss, LIN TV CEO: We're Getting Cash from Time Warner
Cable; Retransmission-Consent Deal Yields Cash for Station Group, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/80934-
LINTVCEOWe reGettingCash FromTimeWarnerCable.php (noting that a
month-long dispute between LIN and Time Warner Cable "left LIN TV stations black
[not carried by Time Warner's cable systems] in 11 markets"); John Eggerton, Meredith,
Cable One at Retrans Impasse in Phoenix, BROADCASTING & CABLE, (Dec. 30, 2008),
available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/161356-
33
The Antitrust Division has recognized the existence of a market
for retransmission rights on one occasion. In United States v. Texas
Television, Inc., the government alleged that several television
stations in the Corpus Christi, Texas television market had increased
the cost of retransmission rights and restrained competition among
broadcasters for cable carriage in the market by illegally colluding
during negotiations with cable operators.1' The Antitrust Division
settled the case; each of the defendant television stations agreed to
negotiate independently with cable operators in the future.4 1
The Antitrust Division's characterization of a retransmission
rights market has some facial appeal since broadcasters and cable
operators regularly negotiate for such rights and routinely attempt to
obtain more favorable terms for such arrangements, including cash
compensation.146 But whether television stations compete for carriage
on cable systems, as alleged in Texas Television, is less clear. The
relative infrequency of station blackouts-and the relatively short
duration of blackouts when they do occurl 4 -suggests the existence of
a "must buy" relationship between local broadcasters and cable
systems. As a practical matter, television stations that are not
available on the local cable systems are unable to effectively compete
with those that are, because of the expanded coverage-in terms of
household reach-that cable offers. Similarly, cable operators
require each of the local television stations in order to effectively
Meredith_- CableOne atRetransImpasse inPhoenix.php (noting that if Meredith and
Cable One were unable to reach an agreement, that Cable One was "contractually
obligated to drop the signal" of Meredith's television stations from its cable lineup).
144. Complaint at para. 19-20, United States v. Texas Television, et al., Civil No. 96-64
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f070o/0745.htm.
145. United States v. Texas Television, et al., 1997-1 Trade Cas. [ 71,732, 1996 WL
859988 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 1997).
146. See, e.g., Mike Farrell, Retransmission-Consent Fees Boost Broadcast Revenue:
Kagan Study: Compensation For Signals Rose 32% In First Nine Months of 2008,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Jan. 3, 2009), available at http://www.multichannel.com
/article/161507RetransmissionConsentFeesBoostBroadcastRevenueKaganStudy.p
hp (discussing local broadcasters' increasing reliance on retransmission revenue as
advertising rates and compensation from television networks drop).
147. See, e.g., Mike Farrell & Linda Moss, Ops, Broadcasters Give Peace a Chance;
Retransmission Battles Go Down with Barely a Fuss. Is this the Calm Before the Storm?,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 12, 2009, at 6 (noting that the latest retransmission election
and negotiation cycle saw only "scattered station drops"); Linda Moss, Young Stations
Back on Dish: Young Broadcasting, Dish Network resolve three-day retransmission-consent
standoff, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/160799-YoungStationsBackonDish.php
(Young Broadcasting stations pulled from Dish Network lineup for three days).
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compete for subscribers, due largely to the uniqueness of each
station's programming.148
Thus, while television stations located within the same geographic
market clearly compete in certain dimensions, when it comes to
carriage by local cable operators it appears that stations are more
appropriately viewed as complements, rather than substitutes, and
cannot be said to compete in the market for carriage by multichannel
video programming distributors. Accordingly, to the extent that an
agreement between competing television stations involves
retransmission consent arrangements of those two stations, there will
unlikely be any demonstrable adverse competitive effects.14 9
148. Indeed, several of the widely publicized blackouts that occurred as a result of a
breakdown in retransmission consent negotiations have involved high-profile sports
programming as the "pressure point." For example, since only one network, and thus, in
most markets, only one station, has rights to broadcast the Super Bowl, a cable operator
that is forced to drop that station from its lineup risks losing customers to competing
programming suppliers-namely satellite and broadband services. Likewise, the television
station may lose out on the revenues generated by such high profile programming as a
result of the viewers who would have watched but for the fact that the station's signal was
unavailable to cable viewers. See P.J. Bednarski, Wiley: Smooth Shift to DTV; Former
FCC Chair Foresees 'More Regulation' Under Obama, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 8,
2009, at 20 (discussing how some stations might use "holding back the Super Bowl from a
cable operator to extract an agreement"); Ted Hearn, NAB Fights Quiet Period; Says
Consumers Won't Confuse DTV, Retransmission Consent, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept.
15, 2008, at 30 ("[s]ome of the previous retransmission consent disputes have ended just
days before the Super Bowl").
149. At least one cable company disagrees. Mediacom Communications Corporation
recently filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.
violated FCC rules by jointly negotiating retransmission rights on its own behalf as well as
on behalf of its LMA partners. Mike Reynolds, Mediacom Asks FCC For Retrans Help:
Operator Says Sinclair Battle Brewing, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.multichannel.comlarticle/366270-
MediacomAsksFCC ForRetransHelp.php?rssid=20059. In support of Mediacom's
position, the American Cable Association argued that joint negotiation practices in the
retransmission rights market are anticompetitive, explaining "through LMAs and other
transactions, broadcasters leverage their already significant market power by gaining
effective control over multiple stations in a single DMA . . . [s]uch agreements set the
price for retransmission consent for one broadcaster and its direct horizontal competitor."
Comments of the Am. Cable Ass'n, Mediacom Commc'ns Corp. v. Sinclair Broad. Group,
Inc., CSR-8233-C (Nov. 18, 2009). Mediacom agreed to drop its complaint after reaching
a one-year retransmission consent deal with Sinclair in January 2010. Mike Farrell,
Mediacom Reaches Retrans Agreement With Sinclair: One-year Deal Covers 22 Stations, 15
Markets, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.multichannel.com
/article/442963-
UpdatedMediacomReachesRetransAgreement With Sinclair.php?rssid=20059.
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D. Theories of Liability
To the extent cooperative agreements between otherwise
competing broadcasters provide for little more than joint setting of
prices or terms for advertising, or joint scheduling of programming,
they are likely properly deemed per se violations of the antitrust laws,
because on their face the arrangements appear to generate no
efficiencies and thus have no procompetitive benefits. Indeed, the
Texas Television case discussed above, although not explicit in the
court filings, appears to have been construed by the Antitrust
Division as a per se violation because it involved clear price- and
term-fixing behavior among alleged competitors.
In practice, the great majority of cooperative agreements between
competing broadcasters are part of complex arrangements that
provide for much more than merely jointly selling advertising or
acquiring programming. As described in part II, supra, most deals
provide for collocating certain aspects of each station's operations,
combining certain operational functions, and related enhancements
that appear to generate significant cost savings and other
procompetitive benefits. Accordingly, a typical cooperative
agreement is likely to be subjected to a rule of reason analysis.
Applying the rule of reason to a typical time brokerage or local
marketing agreement requires a review of the procompetitive benefits
of such agreements alongside the potential anticompetitive effects.5 o
Such agreements are tantamount to a merger of the stations'
operational aspects, and while the licensee technically retains
ultimate control over the content of its station's broadcasts to remain
compliant with FCC directives, as a practical matter, most brokers
receive de facto control over the day-to-day operation of the brokered
station, including control over sales and programming. Accordingly,
the competition that took place between the licensee's station and the
broker's station-for both programming and advertisers-is reduced,
which may result in higher prices for advertising and less diversity in
programming.
In considering the likelihood of a price increase, regulators must
consider the degree to which audiences of each station are reasonably
substitutable to advertisers, or, put differently, whether advertisers
could reasonably buy around the stations that are parties to the
cooperative agreement."' Diversity of programming may also suffer
150. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007)..
151. See Raycom Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 119, at 5-6.
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because broadcasters whose content is jointly acquired and scheduled
are less likely to compete directly against one another. Two jointly
programmed radio stations, for example, are unlikely to offer formats
that target the same demographic for fear of cannibalizing each
other's audience share. Similarly, jointly owned television stations
are unlikely to schedule programs that target similar demographics-
e.g, two daytime talk shows that target a similar audience-against
one another for the same reason. The result is less programming for
audiences in the targeted demographic, and fewer opportunities for
advertisers to reach that demographic with their advertising, leading
to higher prices for advertising time.
But, in another sense, this counterprogramming dynamic can be
said to increase diversity, since it requires broadcasters to fill airtime
with content that is of interest to different audiences than it may have
otherwise chosen, or adjust the content of its local programming to
attract a distinct audience. The stations' programming thereby
collectively serves a broader segment of the population, but
effectively reduces the number of programming options targeted to
particular audiences. This dynamic illustrates the policy challenges
associated with enforcing laws and regulations that affect
programming diversity; it also underscores how traditional antitrust
doctrine-built upon traditional notions of price, output, and quality,
and based largely on physical commodities and hard goods-is ill-
suited for considering programming diversity.
In the context of local news programming, competing
broadcasters operating under a cooperative agreement will often shift
local news programming to different time slots, so that the two
stations are not competing head-to-head during prime news viewing
hours.1S2 On the one hand, such conduct may be viewed as
152. In Denver, for example, shortly after Local TV's KDVR joined forces with
Tribune's KWGN, see supra part I, programmers moved KWGN's longstanding 9:00 p.m.
newscast to 7:00 p.m., likely to avoid the head-to-head competition with KDVR's 9:00 p.m.
newscast. Joanne Ostrow, What the Deuce is Channel 2 Up To? 7 O'Clock News, THE
DENVER POST (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.denverpost.com/television/ci_12031878. Denver broadcast critic Joanne
Ostrow noted that "[b]y pulling the plug on the struggling 9 p.m. Channel 2 newscast, the
merged stations also make more news viewers available tor Channel 31's 9 p.m. newscast
which is, incidentally, quite the moneymaker." Id. Similarly, Barrington Broadcasting
Group and Granite Broadcasting Group recently entered into an arrangement regarding
their respective stations in Syracuse, New York and Peoria, Illinois. See Granite,
Barrington in Joint Sales Deals, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.tvnewscheck.com/articles/2009/03/02/daily.11. The companies noted that
"[o]ne of the chief advantages of operating these stations under the agreements .. . will be
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procompetitive because it effectively increases the net quantity of
news programming available to viewers by adding newscasts to time
slots that were previously filled with other programming; on the other
hand, the quality of the news reporting and editorial zeal of both
stations' news content may be compromised. 3 Because most stations
that operate under cooperative agreements combine local news
functions, including newsgathering and production, it is conceivable
that there may be less vigorous competition for story acquisition and
development. In other words, the incentive to "scoop" the
competition may be dampened since two of the competitors are
cooperating. Of course, as with programming diversity, assessing the
quality of local news programming or the effectiveness of
newsgathering is an entirely subjective inquiry and not reasonably
susceptible to traditional antitrust analysis.
A rule-of-reason analysis of a cooperative agreement, then,
requires an antitrust regulator to consider the claimed procompetitive
benefits, typically in the form of quantifiable cost efficiencies
garnered from combining certain functions, against the potential
anticompetitive harm which, in the context of higher advertising
rates, is measurable, but largely speculative; and in the context of
programming diversity and news quality, entirely incalculable.
Current antitrust doctrine relies heavily on traditional
quantitative methods for analyzing the competitive effects of a
transaction: market shares based on sales figures, market
concentration, and the predicted effects of price increases in
particular markets. Courts have historically required some degree of
quantitative evidence in order to find a particular business
arrangement to be anticompetitive. Given that many of the
competitive effects of cooperative agreements among competing
broadcasters may not be reasonably identified using traditional
quantitative techniques, it is likely that the Antitrust Division will
face an uphill battle in challenging all but the most egregious of
cooperative agreements, such as those that involve major competitive
forces in a particular market, or those that warrant per se treatment.
the ability to offer local and national news, as well as programming of community interest
in new and varied time periods, giving viewers greater opportunity to watch at their
convenience." Id.
153. Moreover, the programming displaced by the additional local news was,
presumably, watched by somebody. Whether society is better off with additional news
content or the displaced programming is a policy question that cannot be readily answered
by traditional economic or antitrust principles.
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V. Back to the Future: Regulating Cooperative Agreements
It is worth noting that the cooperative agreements among
broadcasters bear a striking resemblance, in terms of function at least,
to the joint operating agreements into which competing newspapers
sometimes entered dating back as far as the 1930s. In the case of
newspapers, a Supreme Court decision followed by an act of
Congress governs the manner by which competing newspapers are
allowed to collude on certain aspects of their operations.
Comparatively, agreements among competing broadcasters remain
relatively unregulated, save for the application of standard antitrust
and communication law precepts discussed previously.
This section looks back at the circumstances surrounding the
Justice Department's enforcement action in the newspaper industry
and the statutory construct that arose as a result; it then examines
how the Justice Department and the FCC might approach
cooperative agreements in the future.
A. Citizen Publishing & the Newspaper Preservation Act
The first joint newspaper operating agreement dates back to 1933
when the Albuquerque Journal and The Albuquerque Tribune
entered into an agreement to combine their non-editorial functions,
but continued to publish two separate, editorially independent
newspapers.154 Throughout the ensuing decades, joint operating
agreements emerged between competing daily newspapers in nearly
twenty cities."'5 The Antitrust Division investigated the practice and
eventually brought suit against the owners of the Tucson Citizen (the
"Citizen") and the Arizona Daily Star (the "Star") alleging that the
joint operating agreement between the two papers violated the
antitrust laws."' The challenged agreement provided for a joint
venture that combined all of the business and operational functions of
the two newspapers."' Although the news and editorial operations
154. JOHN C. BUSTERNA & ROBERT G. PICARD, THE NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION
ACT & ITS APPLICATION 2 (Ablex Publishing 1993).
155. El Paso. TX: Nashville. TN; Evansville, IN; Tueson, AZ; Tulsa, OK; Chattanooga,
TN; Birmingham, AL; Ft. Wayne, ID; Lincoln, NE; Salt Lake City, UT; Shreveport, LA;
Knoxville, TN; Charleston, WV; St. Louis, MO; Pittsburgh, PA; Honolulu, HI; San
Francisco, CA; and Miami, FL. Id. at 2-3.
156. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz 1968), affd, 394
U.S. 131 (1969).
157. Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 133-34.
remained independent, advertising and circulation sales were handled
by a joint venture in which both newspapers were partners.
The government alleged that the agreement constituted a contract
in restraint of trade, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
that it gave the parties a monopoly over the daily local newspaper
market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Finding that
the contract terms were per se unlawful, the court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment on the Section 1 claim.'6
After a trial on the remaining two counts, the court concluded that
the agreement gave the parties an unlawful monopoly over the daily
newspaper business in Tucson.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the district court's
decision.162 In its opinion, the Supreme Court described the contract
as violating the antitrust laws in three principal ways: (1) price fixing,
because the price of each newspaper, and the advertising that
appeared in them, was set by the joint venture; (2) profit pooling,
since the profits of each paper flowed to the joint venture and were,
in turn, split evenly between the partners; and (3) market control, as
the agreement between the two papers prohibited stakeholders in the
joint venture from engaging in any other business in the geographic
area.
Notably, the Court specifically explained that nothing in the
antitrust laws prohibited the two papers from combining certain
operations; the law simply commanded that the two papers remained
independent competitors and that the agreement between them
eliminate the price fixing, market control, and profit pooling
provisions. ' The district court had noted that "[tlhe printing and
distribution of Star and Citizen through the joint use of substantially
the same mechanical equipment does not depend upon the
continuation of the price fixing, profit pooling, and market allocation
agreements."1 65  Thus, although the court held that the particular
arrangement between the two Tucson newspapers was illegal, nothing
158. Id.
159. Id. at 134.
160. Id.
161. Citizen Publ'g, 280 F. Supp. at 993. The court also found that the Citizen's
acquisition of Star stock violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id.
162. Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 140.
163. Id. at 134.
164. Id. at 135.
165. Citizen Publ'g, 280 F. Supp. at 992.
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in the court's decision prevented newspaper owners from entering
into agreements to combine back-office functions like printing and
distribution, so long as the newspapers' editorial and sales operations
remained independent.'"
While the Citizen Publishing case wound its way through the
courts, the newspaper industry rallied Congress to create an
exception to the antitrust law that would essentially permit certain
qualifying, competing daily newspapers to eliminate competition in
all but their editorial operations. The result of those legislative
efforts came in 1970 as the Newspaper Preservation Act (the
"NPA")," which was aimed at maintaining an editorially
independent and competitive newspaper industry by preserving
newspapers that are in financial distress by allowing them to enter
into joint operating agreements ("JOAs")" upon approval of the
Attorney General. 6  The NPA thus effectively provided such
arrangements with immunity from antitrust scrutiny. The Act also
immunized those JOAs that were in existence prior to the Act's
passage.x1o
In effect, the NPA overturned Citizen Publishing by permitting
competing newspapers to combine all but their editorial and
reportorial functions, including those functions that, under Citizen
Publishing, would have been illegal to combine. The NPA reflects
Congress's determination that the potential anticompetitive effects of
166. Id. at 992-93 ("the restoration of competition to the daily newspaper business in
Tucson requires that Star and Citizen have separate advertising departments and
circulation departments").
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04.
168. Id. § 1802(2) defines a JOA as:
[a]ny contract, agreement, joint venture (whether or not incorporated),
or other arrangement entered into by two or more newspapers owners
for the publication of two or more newspaper publications, pursuant to
which joint or common production facilities are established or operated
and joint or unified action is taken or agreed to be taken with respect to
any one or more of the following: printing; time, method, and field of
publication; allocation of production facilities; distribution; advertising
solicitation; circulation solicitation; business department; establishment
of advertising rates; establishment of circulation rates and revenue
distribution: Provided, That there is no merger, combination, or
amalgamation of the editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial
policies be independently determined.
169. Id. § 1803(b).
170. Id. § 1803(a).
41
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
allowing profit sharing and the joint setting of prices for advertising
and subscriptions are outweighed by the social benefits of
maintaining two competing editorial voices."'
B. The Future Role of the Justice Department
Although Congress ultimately concluded that the risk of losing
editorial competition outweighed the potential anticompetitive effects
of collusion in certain newspaper markets, it remains true that prior
to the NPA, the agreement between the two Tucson newspapers
violated the antitrust laws.
Despite the apparent similarities between joint operating
agreements in newspapers and the agreements into which many
broadcasters enter, the Antitrust Division has taken virtually no
enforcement action stemming from cooperative agreements among
competitors. Although the Antitrust Division has occasionally
weighed in on proposed mergers of broadcasting firms and, in some
cases, required divestitures in order to permit certain transactions to
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consummate, mere agreements between broadcasters, even if they
mimic the effects of an ownership transfer, have escaped scrutiny.
Although early uses of cooperative agreements, such as the time
brokerage agreements used by producers of foreign language
programming,'73 were unlikely to raise competitive concerns, the
purpose and scope of cooperative agreements has evolved over time.
Whereas such agreements were once used for specific programs or
blocks of time, broadcasters today regularly use time brokerage and
171. Despite the Act's laudable policy objectives, critics of the NPA have long
complained that the Act was unnecessary to achieve them. Since the efficiency-enhancing
aspects of jointly operating back-office functions of competing newspapers were
allowable, even after Citizen Publishing, the ruling "could have been viewed as a great
opportunity for competing newspapers throughout the country to immediately form cost-
sharing joint operations even (or especially) while both newspapers were financially
healthy and profitable." BUSTERNA ET AL., supra note 154, at 35. Some JOA scholars
have opined that the true intent of the newspaper lobbyists who championed the NPA had
little to do with newspaper preservation, but rather, was principally aimed at achieving
monopoly pricing for advertising and subscriptions. One Senator described the NPA as "a
millionaire-crybabies-publishers' bill." Jason A. Martin, Reversing the Erosion of
Editorial Diversity: How the Newspaper Preservation Act Has Failed and What Can Be
Done, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 63, 75 (2008) (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 2009, 2009 (1970)).
172. See, e.g., Final Judgment at pt. IV, United States v. Raycom Media, Inc., Civil No.
08-01510 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f240100/240199.pdf; Final Judgment at pt. IV, United
States v. Bain Capital, LLC, Civil No. 08-00245 (D.D.C. Jul. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239600/239659.pdf.
173. See supra Part II.B
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local marketing agreements as a way to capture effective control of a
competing broadcaster without the regulatory scrutiny that an
outright license transfer would invite under both FCC regulations and
the antitrust laws. Some critics of the practice have asserted that
certain broadcasters have used cooperative agreements to circumvent
the FCC's ownership limits.
News sharing and shared service agreements, while dealing with
narrower aspects of the brokered station's operations, have become
relatively commonplace and raise significant questions about the
quantity, quality, and diversity of local programming, including news
and public affairs programs. Moreover, such agreements were once
largely unique to smaller markets, where the size of the potential
audience rendered unfavorable the economics of operating multiple
separate news operations, and where the volume of commerce
transacted in the advertising market was sufficiently small that they
likely would escape serious scrutiny by the Antitrust Division. Today,
such content pooling and sharing agreements are appearing in some
of the largest markets in the country. As the media industry
continues to fragment, and revenues from advertising continue to
drop, there exists a strong likelihood that the use of cooperative
agreements will become even more widespread.
In view of the changing nature of cooperative agreements
between broadcasters, and the increased frequency with which such
agreements are being used as a central component of some
broadcasters' business models, the Antitrust Division should become
more active in policing these agreements by aggressively examining
the practice generally, as well as investigating the circumstances
surrounding particular agreements that appear to be facially
problematic. While many cooperative arrangements between
broadcasters likely generate significant procompetitive benefits that
ultimately benefit consumers-through improved programming,
news, and lower costs to advertisers-it is possible that, just as in the
Citizen Publishing case, the procompetitive aspects of the
arrangement are tied together with anticompetitive provisions that
are simply unnecessary to effectuate the procompetitive aspects of the
agreement. In those cases, the Antitrust Division should take the
steps necessary to excise the problematic aspects of the agreements.
C. The Role of the FCC
Unlike the Antitrust Division, the FCC is uniquely situated to
consider the noneconomic aspects of cooperative agreements
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between competing broadcasters. Indeed, the FCC's broad statutory
mandate is to ensure that broadcasters operate consistent with the
public interest, and the Commission has a long history of, and a fair
amount of established precedent on, doing just that. But like the
Antitrust Division, the FCC's history of reviewing cooperative
agreements is limited. Although such agreements must be filed with
the FCC in many circumstances, the process is largely ministerial, and
it is uncommon for the Commission to disapprove of a particular
agreement on the basis that it impugns the public interest.
The FCC should heighten its review of cooperative agreements
between broadcasters and consider such agreements through the
same analytical lenses that it considers license transfers and other
ownership issues today.'74 Although the FCC and the Antitrust
Division should continue to separately investigate transactions, the
two agencies should cooperate to facilitate such reviews.
Of course, various confidentiality statutes and regulations would
likely prevent the FCC from sharing certain confidential information
disclosed to the agency by its licensees, but since most licensee filings
end up in publicly accessible files, the FCC could easily share the
public, redacted versions of such agreements with the Justice
Department. In the event that the Antitrust Division determine that
a particular transaction warrant further investigation, it can seek a
copy of the full, confidential agreement on a voluntary basis, or issue
174. The effectiveness of the FCC's ownership regulation regime is regularly a subject
of considerable debate. Public interest advocates often argue that the FCC's ownership
regulations do little to advance or protect the public interest, and that enforcement of
those regulations is often done halfheartedly. See, e.g., Michael J. Copps, Commissioner,
Fed. Comm. Com'ssion, Remarks Delivered at the FCC Media Bureau Ownership
Workshop: Scholars' Panel (Nov. 2, 2009); Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President & CEO,
Media Access Project, Remarks Delivered at the FCC Media Bureau Ownership
Workshop: Public Interest Panel (Nov. 3, 2009). Industry participants, on the other hand,
argue that the ownership regulations are unnecessary to ensure the FCC's public interest
objectives, particularly in today's new media economy where legacy media properties are
facing fierce competition from online sources and user-created content. See, e.g., David J.
Barrett, President & CEO, Hearst Television, Inc., Remarks Delivered at the FCC Media
Bureau Ownership Workshop: Industry Panel (Nov. 4, 2009); Jane E. Mago, Executive
Vice President & General Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters, Remarks
Delivered at the FCC Media Bureau Ownership Workshop: Industry Panel (Nov. 4, 2009).
The purpose of this discussion is not to assess the merits of the FCC's ownership regime,
but rather, simply to suggest that the FCC should begin to consider cooperative
agreements more actively and to do so in a manner consistent with the FCC's ownership
regulations.
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compulsory process under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, a process
consistent with the Division's typical investigative practice. 176
The FCC has demonstrated renewed interest in cooperative
agreements, recently issuing a request for additional information
about an arrangement between stations in Honolulu.'77  That
arrangement provided for Raycom, which owns television stations
KHNL, an NBC affiliate, and KFVE, a MyNetworkTV affiliate, to
effectively take control over the programming and operational
aspects of CBS-affiliated KGMB, owned by MCG Capital.7
Although the FCC had received redacted versions of the relevant
agreements-a shared service agreement, studio lease, and
management services contract-in response to a prior request,79 the
Commission's subsequent letter sought un-redacted versions of
certain schedules and ancillary agreements.' The FCC also sought
"further clarification of certain provisions" and called upon the
parties to explain the nature of the relationship among them and,
significantly, to explain why the relationship is not attributable under
applicable Commission rules.' As discussed previously, if the
authority bestowed by the agreements gives Raycom excessive
control over KGMB, the station may become attributable, for
ownership purposes, to Raycom, and would then likely violate the
FCC's ownership regulations. 2 Arrangements such as the one in
Hawaii may have antitrust implications as well.
175. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14.
176. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST
DIVISION MANUAL ch. 3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf (July 2009) (setting forth
the Antitrust Division's investigative practices).
177. Letter from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Division, Media Bureau, Fed
Commc'n Comm'n to Jonathan D. Blake, Esq., attorney for Raycom Media, Inc., and
John Griffith Johnson, Jr., attorney for HITV License Subsidiary, Inc., 1-2 (Nov. 10, 2009)
(copy obtained from Honolulu Star Advertiser web site; no longer available online)
[hereinafter FCC Hawaii Letter].
178. See Michael Malone, Raycom to Manage Honolulu CBS: Market "Cannot
Support" Five Separate Stations, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/327954-
Raycom toManageHonoluluCBS.php.
179. FCC Hawaii Letter, supra note 177, at 1.
180. Id. at 1-2.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Based on 2008 revenue figures, KGMB is the third ranked station in the market;
KHNL is fourth. If KGMB were attributable to Raycom, it would be deemed to control
two of the top four stations in the market, thereby violating the FCC's ownership caps.
Honolulu, Hawaii, INVESTING IN TELEVISION MARKET REPORT (BIA Advisory Services
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D. The Impact of the New Media Economy
Many industry participants have argued that the increasing use of
cooperative agreements and the development of new forms of such
agreements, such as the news and content sharing arrangements are
due largely to the economic climate of the industry."' The legacy
media audience has become increasingly fragmented, as viewers and
listeners turn to alternative-usually Internet-based-sources for
content. As a result, audiences are spread over more media options,
giving a smaller share of the total audience to each media outlet. The
reduction in audience share has led to a sharp decline in advertising
revenues that, for most legacy media entities, is the core source of
their operating income.
Some broadcasters say that cooperative agreements among
competing broadcasters are the only way the industry can remain
viable. Some stations simply cannot sustain an independent news
department, for example, so they enter into a shared services
agreement whereby one station, usually an economically stronger
station, agrees to produce newscasts for the economically weaker
station. Supporters of the practice argue that such an arrangement
achieves two positive outcomes: (1) it allows stations to reduce costs
by leveraging valuable efficiencies, and (2) it enhances the stations'
output by allowing them to offer more hours of local news
programming per day, on a combined basis, than either station could
or would have done on its own. This argument presupposes, of
course, that two stations collectively producing news content is better
than one station doing it independently. Whether that supposition is
true is both entirely subjective and likely best left to the legislative
branch.
Given the economic climate of broadcasting, many industry
players have called upon regulators to ease ownership restrictions
and, implicitly, by extension, ease scrutiny of cooperative agreements
that mimic certain effects of ownership transfers." They argue,
among other things, that the same market forces that have led to a
decline in advertiser revenues also have given audiences an
2009) (providing revenue shares); see supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the "two-of-the-top-
four" rule).
183. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 178 (arguing that Honolulu cannot support five
separate stations); Paul Farhi, The Story Out of 3 Area TV Stations: They'll Create News-
Sharing Service, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, at C1 (discussing news sharing venture
among three Washington, D.C. television stations).
184. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 174; Mago, supra note 174.
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unprecedented number of options for content. The legacy media
must compete with countless new media options and that the merger
of two legacy media properties-either through a traditional
ownership transfer or through a cooperative agreement that
essentially simulates such a transfer-is competitively insignificant
when considered against all of the other options available to
audiences. Put simply, some broadcasters argue that regulators need
not concern themselves with legacy media because of its fading
relevance in light of industry changes and technological advances.
However, many of the new and allegedly competitive distribution
models are still nascent and it remains unclear whether, and to what
degree, new media options are, or may become, true substitutes for
legacy media. Some suggest that new media simply complement
legacy media, and that the increased availability of content online
does little to curtail the anticompetitive effects of media
consolidation. Moreover, many of the so-called "new" media sources
are comprised simply of repurposed content from legacy sources. For
example, some of the most popular online sources for news are web
sites run by newspapers, such as NYTimes.com, television networks,
such as CNN.com, or local broadcasters, such as MyFoxDC.com, the
web site of Washington, D.C.'s Fox-affiliated television station. So,
while the legacy media as a distribution platform may well be
faltering, it is clear that content development and distribution
functions of many legacy media organizations remain very much a
part of the new media landscape, at least for now.
While the idea that the legacy media's waning significance
justifies a relaxation of the regulatory environment in which it
operates does have some facial appeal, the fact that legacy media
operations are now moving much of their content output to
nontraditional platforms suggests that regulators should, if anything,
increase their scrutiny of media transactions because of their impact
on a rapidly developing industry. Moreover, because many of the
new media technologies largely fall outside of the FCC's jurisdiction,
the role of the Antitrust Division takes on an increased importance in
the new media economy.
VI. Conclusion
Both the FCC and the Antitrust Division currently possess the
statutory authority and the analytical tools necessary to properly
analyze the competitive effects of cooperative agreements among
competing broadcasters; yet, historically, neither agency has been
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particularly active in investigating such arrangements. While each
agency considers outright ownership transfers pursuant to their
respective statutory mandates, neither agency appears to have fully
appreciated the fact that many cooperative agreements result in
relationships that mimic the effects of an ownership transfer. As
cooperative agreements become increasingly common in the rapidly
changing media marketplace, and as the number of players appears to
shrink, both regulatory agencies must take a renewed look at the
competitive effects of such transactions. The FCC must focus on the
audience side of the market, while the Antitrust Division must focus
on the advertising side.
The type of heightened scrutiny demonstrated by the FCC in the
Honolulu matter discussed previously typifies precisely the sort of
review that regulators should be undertaking as cooperative
arrangements among competing broadcasters become more
commonplace. Such investigations likely pose little additional burden
on the parties since they already provide copies of relevant deal
documents to the FCC as required by various filing rules; it would
require little additional effort or expense to also require that the
parties file an un-redacted version with both the FCC and the
Antitrust Division.
Even if after an appropriate investigation the vast majority of
cooperative agreements are deemed to be procompetitive, or, at least,
not anticompetitive or contrary to the public interest, the existence of
a renewed interest on behalf of antitrust regulators will serve as an
effective monitor on broadcasters' conduct, to ensure that their
cooperative agreements go only as far as necessary to generate
procompetitive efficiencies while still maintaining a robust, diverse
and competitive local media marketplace. As the regulatory agencies
become more familiar with the nature and scope of such
arrangements and build a body of institutional knowledge about such
arrangements, they will become better positioned to quickly assess
the potential effects-both positive and negative-of particular
structures or practices, which will ultimately increase the speed and
effectiveness of the review process.
There is little doubt that the media industry has changed since
time brokerage agreements were first used more than seventy years
ago, and there is little doubt that in many circumstances, the use of
cooperative agreements may be a valuable way to combine resources,
leverage efficiencies, and deliver high-quality programming to
audiences and effective delivery platforms to advertisers. There is
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likely some truth to the broadcasting industry's cry that such
arrangements are, in some cases, necessary to ensure that the industry
remains viable. Although many stations have remained relatively
successful, many are struggling, facing increased competition from
new media sources, fragmented audiences, and sharply declining
advertising revenues. For those stations, the use of a cooperative
agreement may generate the ultimate procompetitive benefit: the
continued existence of a market participant.
Cooperative agreements between competing broadcasters
represent a form of innovation, and through proper application such
arrangements may help broadcasters capture efficiencies and improve
performance. If used responsibly, cooperative agreements are not
necessarily inconsistent with broadcasters' obligations to serve the
public interest. Thus, when used appropriately, such arrangements
can be virtuous; but if left unchecked, there exists the potential that
some broadcasters may use cooperative agreements nefariously, to
avoid ownership limitations or other regulatory restrictions aimed at
maintaining the integrity of the public's spectrum. Neither the FCC
nor the Antitrust Division should take the position that such
agreements are either per se lawful or unlawful, but rather, they most
analyze such arrangements on a case-by-case basis to ensure that
broadcasters properly service their communities and advance the
public interest as they have done for decades.
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